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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 1974 NUMBER 3
THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE IN CHOICE OF
LAW: A RECONSIDERATION OF
OLDER THEMES
GARY J. SIMSON*
When presented with a cause of action not confined in its elements
to the forum state, courts have on occasion announced that although
the application of another jurisdiction's law is indicated in the instant
case, they must decline to apply it because the law violates local public
policy. In a classic formulation of the public policy doctrine, then-
Judge Cardozo stated the test to be whether the foreign law can be
said to "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal."1 The impact on the party against whom this doctrine is invoked
may vary. A plaintiff whose complaint is dismissed on public policy
grounds' will find no hospitable court for his action in the forum state.
* Member of the Connecticut Bar. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, Yale University.
1. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
2. Cases involving a dismissal on grounds of local policy regarding the allocation
of judicial resources are not within the scope of this Article. See generally Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes of Sister
States, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 441 (1952). Rather, the focus of this Article is the rejection
of the application of foreign law on substantive grounds-i.e. because of the content of
the specific law. Also distinguishable from the public policy doctrine is rejection of a
cause of action because it calls for enforcement of foreign penal laws. For the special
considerations raised by the penal doctrine, see Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal
and Governmental Claims, 46 H~Av. L. Rav. 193 (1932).
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If the dismissal is made without prejudice, he may seek enforcement
of his claim in another state. The latter possibility, however, may often
prove illusory because of difficulties in obtaining personal jurisdiction
over the defendant outside the state of the initial action.3 The fate
of a defendant denied the opportunity to raise a defense for public
policy reasons lacks any such ambiguities. Assuming no other ade-
quate defense, he has lost on the merits, and a sister state is obliged
under the full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgment against
him. 4
The dissent to this doctrine long took the form of moral indignation.
For one state to declare another's laws too abhorrent to enforce was
for Beach "an intolerable affectation of superior virtue."5 Goodrich,
in a similar vein, counseled "mutual tolerance for each other's little
idiosyncracies"' and sought to persuade the doctrine's defenders that
by applying foreign law in accordance with the mandate of basic choice
of law rules,
it [a state] does not, by such reference, flaunt its local policy with an
implied recognition of the other state's as better; it does not make
an appraisal one way or the other, but simply applies the foreign
rule as the appropriate one to determine this transaction.7
Nussbaum vehemently led the counterattack. He urged that "practic-
ing liberalism becomes preposterous where it is exercised towards a
foreign law which is plainly directed against the interests of the forum,"
and argued the consistency of the public policy doctrine with an inform-
ing principle of American federalism-namely, "territorially limited
experimentation.""
Goodrich and others' seemed to get the better of the argument, at
3. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 212 n.88 (1963)
(and sources cited) [hereinafter cited as CuamE]; cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 562 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1962).
4. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 290 (1866); Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818); R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 410-11 (1971).
5. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662
(1918).
6. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26, 35 (1938).
7. Id. at 33. But cf. CURIE 182.
8. Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49
YALE L.J. 1027, 1048-49, 1054 (1940). The impact on Nussbaum's position of the
then-existing Fascist threat, it may be noted, is unmistakable. See also Kronstein, Crisis
of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. LI. 483 (1949).
9. See, e.g., Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19
MINN. L. REv. 196 (1935).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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least in volume, with their indignant protests against parochialism.
Some commentators, however, intimated that this umbrage might be
fundamentally misguided. Courts invoke local public policy in choice
of law, they argued, not so much out of dislike for the applicable foreign
law but rather, in Cavers' terms, as a device to escape from the injustice
or incongruity of applying the foreign law in a particular case.1"
Because it provides an easy out from the result indicated by application
of traditional rules, the public policy doctrine is objectionable as an
escape from thoughtful articulation of better, more relevant conflict-
of-law rules. With the development of Cavers' view in greater so-
phistication and detail by Paulsen and Sovern," this conception of the
doctrine appears to have relegated the more traditional criticisms of
the public policy doctrine to the periphery, if not to total obscurity.12
Indeed, if the doctrine is only a guise-its invocation not really a state-
ment on the content of the other jurisdiction's law at all-and its vice
an invitation to unrigorous analysis, one would seem well advised to
direct one's anger about parochialism elsewhere.
The preemptive claim of the Paulsen-Sovem thesis, however, may
not be as sound as is generally conceded. In this Article, I begin with
the proposition that Professors Paulsen and Sovern have not wrested
the field from the traditional critics. The parochialism argument
against the public policy doctrine is one which can and should be made.
It needs to be formulated, though, not in the metaphysical "right"-
"wrong" terms in which Beach and his ideological brethren cast it, but
instead contextually, in terms of the aggregate social consequences of
the doctrine's employment. This Article attempts both to supplement
and partly to supplant the Paulsen-Sovern contentions against the doc-
trine by reinvigorating-or, perhaps more precisely, bringing to matur-
ation-arguments directed at the doctrine's parochial tenor.
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PAULSEN-SOVERN PERSPECTIVE
The contribution of the Paulsen-Sovern study to an understanding of
10. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173, 180-
84 (1933). See also Note, The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict of Laws, 33
COLUM. L. REv. 508, 513 (1933).
11. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv.
969 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen & Sovern].
12. See E. CHnIAAM, E. GRiSWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 403 (5th ed. 1964); R. CRAMToN & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 146-47
(1968); CuiuuE 133 n.27, 181; Note, Illegality and Public Policy in the Conflict of
Laws, 12 How. L.J. 331 (1966).
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the application of the public policy doctrine is of unquestionable sig-
nificance. Writing in the best legal realist tradition,' 8 the authors pene-
trated the courts' public explanations of their decision-making processes
and set forth a view of the public policy doctrine attuned not to what
courts say they are doing, but rather to what they are really doing:
In short, "public policy" is one way to avoid the application of a
choice of law rule which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of
the forum, thus, is not -to -the content of the law but to its own choice of
law rule ....
The overwhelming number of cases which have rejected foreign law
on public policy grounds are cases with which the forum had some im-
portant connection. It is apparent, then, that in most cases the choice
of local rather than foreign law cannot be regarded simply as a matter
of parochialism. 14
The attractiveness and basic plausibility of this thesis should not be
allowed to obscure its limitations. For in two fundamental respects,
one rooted in basic psychology and the other in the scope of the authors'
focus on the social process, the, Paulsen-Sovern view fails to displace
the "classical concept' 5 (as they disparagingly call it) of the public
policy doctrine or to obviate the necessity for further development of
the traditional criticisms.
A. Suspicion of the Judicial Process
Despite their basically cynical approach to a court's rendition of its
grounds for decision, Paulsen and Sovern implicitly take a surprisingly
roseate view of institutional bias. Any time a state court has before
it two laws for possible application, one of the forum state and the
other not, one should find little difficulty in assuming that the court,
as an arm of the state governmental apparatus, will by nature tend to
favor its own state's law. When comparing "our" law with "their" law,
then, the judiciary's reasoning would always seem to be somewhat sus-
pect due to an ingrained bias. 1' An. interest analysis, for example,
would not unexpectedly be skewed in favor of forum state policies.' 7
13. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); W. MOORE, LAW
AN LEARmNo THEoRY (1943); F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAwYERs! (2d ed. 1957).
14. Paulsen & Sovern 981.
15. Id. at 972.
16. -I have developed this we-they notion of suspicion of process at considerable
length- in another context. Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE
LJ. 1237 (1974).
17. This bias might take the form of (1) readiness to find forum policies implicated
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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And if one will grant that an endemic favoritism for local law is often
operative sub rosa, why doubt the authenticity in many instances of
the explicit judicial expressions of distaste for foreign laws made when
applying the public policy doctrine? The public policy doctrine simply
conforms too well to natural parochial tendencies-people's readiness
to assume the good about themselves and the bad about others-to
be characterized as almost always an escape device, something
epiphenomenal to the substance of the court's reasoning.
This somewhat intuitive response to the Paulsen-Sovem view draws
support from two rather separate lines of cases. On the one hand, var-
ious express invocations of the doctrine are so emphatic in their de-
nunciation of foreign law, or are predicated on such minimal contacts
with the forum state, that they seem inexplicable except as policy judg-
ments on the content of the foreign law. Aboitiz & Co. v. Price,18 in
which the court disallowed a defense based on penal laws of the Jap-
anese Military Government of World War 11, is a graphic illustration
of this line. Also notable in this regard is Jacobsen v. Saner,9 in which
an Iowa court dismissed an alienation of affections action having all
relevant contacts in Minnesota (and rather obviously unenforceable
outside the defendant's home state of Iowa). Similarly, in Fox v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.,20 a Wisconsin court struck down a defense
and nonforum policies not, or (2) inclination to overestimate the magnitude of forum
interests at stake and to underestimate the magnitude of nonforum interests. This latter
possibility for expression of bias assumes some willingness to weigh forum against non-
forum interests in the first place. A court might, however, simply always regard a
forum interest, where present, as decisive regardless of the relative significance of non-
forum interests.
18. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951).
Performance of the obligation of these notes is not illegal in the United
States. It is the assertion of a defense and the failure to perform in reliance
upon a Japanese penal decree, which violates our most deeply held views of
conscientious conduct and sound public policy .
This is the kind of defense. .. which is "not merely contrary to the pub-
lic policy of the forum, but distinctly pernicious thereto". ....
Id. at 626, quoting 6 S. WmLL]sToN, A TREArisE ON Ta IAw oF CoTmcrs § 1792,
at 5095 n.5 (rev. ed. 1938).
19. 247 Iowa 191, 72 N.W.2d 900 (1955). The Jacobsens were married in Min-
nesota, resided there during the alleged acts of Saner, then a Minnesota resident, alienat-
ing Mrs. Jacobsen from her husband, and received their divorce in a Minnesota court.
Iowa, where defendant Saner resided at the time of suit, has a statutory bar to alienation
of affection actions; Minnesota recognizes such suits. The Iowa Court found its statute
to compel dismissal as "a clear and positive statement of the public policy of the state"
rendering "the 'comity' rule.. . not applicable." Id. at 194, 72 N.W.2d at 901.
20. 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909). Defendant, a New York telegraph cor-
poration, received for transmission from its New York office a message to a person in
395Vol. 1974:391]
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available in the two states far more significantly connected with the
transaction than Wisconsin.
On the other hand, there are cases not resting explicitly on public
policy grounds but rather transparently affected by such considerations.
Typical of this group is Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co.,"' in which
a Texas court's extensive public policy dictum underlines the token na-
ture of its ultimate place-of-contract characterization. In Holzer v.
Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft,22 the New York Court of Appeals
adopted an analogous tack by outlining a route of statutory construction
which averted the impact of the court's refusal to disallow as against
New York public policy a defense predicted on a discriminatory Nazi
edict. Basically, these tacit invocations of the public policy doctrine
are the foil to the cases highlighted by Paulsen and Sovern. By sug-
Chicago. Despite notice by the plaintiff-sender of the importance of the message's
timely arrival in Chicago, the message did in fact arrive there later than promised. As
a result, the addressee made an unnecessary trip, the cost of which constituted the al-
leged damages in the case. At issue in Fox was the force of an exculpatory clause in-
cluded in the company's standard transmission contract. Tersely characterizing the
place of contract as New York and the place of tort as Illinois, and conceding the con-
tract's validity in New York and its probable enforceability in either New York or Il-
linois, the Wisconsin court gave a lengthy disquisition on the public policy doctrine. It
concluded by denying the aid of Wisconsin, which by statute affirms liability for such
negligent transmission, in enforcing the clause. Cf. Hare v. Family Publications Sen,.,
Inc., 334 F. Supp. 953, 961 (D. Md. 1971).
21. 252 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Appellee sued on two notes executed in
Texas by appellants (and then assigned to appellee) to purchase stock in a Mexican cor-
poration engaged, inter alia, in selling liquor. Any sale of liquor within Texas was at
that time prohibited by the Federal and Texas Constitutions; any notes given pursuant
to such a sale, therefore, would be uncollectible. After vigorously expounding the public
policy doctrine and ostensibly conceding the validity of the instant transaction absent
invocation of the doctrine, the court rather disingenuously found Texas to qualify as the
lex loci.
22. 277 N.Y. 474, 479-80, 14 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1938):
In respect to the second cause of action, the result is necessarily different.
We are dealing merely with pleadings. Assuming, as alleged, that plaintiff be-
came unable without any fault on his part to continue his services subsequent
to April, 1933, that part of the agreement which is alleged to provide "that
in the event the plaintiff should die or become unable, without fault on his
part, to serve during the period of the contract the defendants would pay to
him or his heirs the sum of 120,000 marks, in discharge of their obligations,
under the hiring aforesaid," must be interpreted according to German law and
the meaning of German words. What that law is depends upon the solution
of questions of fact which must be determined on the trial. If the English
words "become unable" are a correct translation of the German words em-
ployed in the contract, then they would not appear to be limited to inability
caused by physical illness but might be intended to apply to any factor which
might prevent his service.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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gesting a tendency of public policy considerations to insinuate them-
selves into the judicial process, these cases caution against a simplistic
sequestration of cases like Aboitiz and Fox as anomalies. In so doing,
they cast doubt upon Paulsen and Sovern's assertion of an almost com-
plete divorce between what courts say and what moves them to say it
in resolving choice-of-law problems on public policy grounds.
My point is not, I should emphasize, that Paulsen and Sovern have
failed to provide a useful tool for understanding many public policy
cases. Indeed they have. But they have erred in laying far too broad
a claim for the utility of their insight. Close attention to their analysis
of cases reveals various facile and dubious corroborations of their
theory. They manage to isolate an "important connection";23 yet, very
simply, the mere presence of such contacts hardly excludes the possi-
bility that a court was moved to invoke the public policy doctrine by
genuine policy considerations and not by a desire to cloak a result-
oriented decision process. In general, to prove a negative-that courts,
in invoking the public policy doctrine, almost never mean what they
say-far more cogent and comprehensive evidence than the authors of-
fer would seem requisite.
Paulsen and Sovern's theory does not lack plausibility. Given, how-
ever, the basic psychological inferences to be drawn and the authors'
inability to produce convincing evidence in rebuttal, it fails by a wide
margin in its claim to virtual exclusivity. The public policy doctrine
is, I submit, a far more accurate reflection of a court's objection to
the content of foreign law than Paulsen and Sovern allow. Accordingly,
the criticisms of the doctrine made by Beach and his fellow antagonists
to judicial parochialism are very much in point. They coexist quite
compatibly, moreover, with the Paulsen-Sovem "substitute for analy-
sis" 24 line of attack because of the non-mutually exclusive nature of
these competing characterizations of the public policy doctrine.
B. The Perception of Authoritative Decision
The second limitation of the Paulsen-Sovern thesis, one emerging
from the authors' unduly narrow focus on the process of making de-
cisions in the public sector, also invites further development of the tra-
ditional line of doctrinal criticism. Generally, Paulsen and Sovern fix
their attention on the judge to the exclusion of his audience. Even
23. Paulsen & Sovern 981.
24. Id. at 1016.
Vol. 1974:391]
Washington University Open Scholarship
398 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:391
if their explanation of the functional significance of the public policy
doctrine were a perfectly accurate description of the judicial decision
process, it would still provide an incomplete understanding of the doc-
trine. To be comprehensive, their explanation must also take into ac-
colmt other decision-makers' perceptions of the judge's application of
the doctrine: the reasonable expectation would seem to be that others
would generally understand invocations of the public policy doctrine
to be statements of affirmation of local law and censure of foreign law.
lEven assuming that Paulsen and Sovern have discovered the essence
of the doctrine, the fact remains that the type of legal realist perspective
that informs their thesis would be alien to the great majority of non-
lawyers in positions of power, as well as to many persons instructed
in the ways of the law.25 As a result of the authors' failure to consider
the judicial statement as a symbolic communication understood and
acted upon by the wide range of participants in the social process,"
they overlook a cogent argument against the public policy doctrine. For
if the effect of invoking the doctrine is to accentuate parochial tend-
encies at other points in the process, an attack on the doctrine as an
agent of parochialism is plainly warranted.
To pinpoint parochializing effects would obviously necessitate ex-
tensive empirical research. On the other hand, available evidence does
appear to support the inference of parochializing effects radiating from
an invocation of the public policy doctrine. Thus, state courts-which
a, legal realist might suppose should know better-have taken umbrage
at rejections of their states' laws by sister state courts on public policy
grounds, and have even gone on record with thinly veiled affirmations
of retaliatory intent. In one such display of pique, Arizona's high court
in Forgan v. Bainbridge struck back at Texas' courts for invoking the
doctrine against foreign chattel mortgage contracts:
The rule of comity is essentially based upon the principle of reciproc-
ity. . . . It would seem therefore, that, when a sister state does not
recognize and will not enforce in her courts the rule of law in regard
to a certain class of contracts having their inception in this state, we
are not required under the doctrine of comity to enforce similar con-
tracts according to her rule, when such rule is directly opposed to our
public policy.27
25. See Miller, The Role of the University Law School in the Evolutionary Scheme,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14-18.
26. Cf. H. LAsswnri, PoLrncs: WHo GEms WHAT, WMrN, How 31-45 (1958).
27. 34 Ariz. 408, 415-16, 274 P. 155, 158 (1928). Basically, the Texas courts' re-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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The group of potential agents for interstate retribution is not limited,
however, simply to a state court's counterparts in other states. Judicial
opinions-or at least some digest of their contents-come to the atten-
tion of many in positions of power other than judges. Legislators, ad-
ministrators, "private" persons discharging informational, promotional,
and often effectively prescriptive functions in decisions regulating the
public sector-all are aware in varying degrees of court decisions touch-
ing upon their interests. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume
that the above example of judicial retaliation against another state's
court for its ostensible denigration of the forum state's law might be
mirrored elsewhere in the process of interstate activity.
A legislature's response to an invocation of the doctrine against its
state's laws might easily be imagined. It would probably take the form
of a withdrawal of some indulgence, such as funds for ongoing or pro-
spective joint activity or simply consent to a reciprocal agreement. Sim-
ilarly, a response to another state's adverse use of the doctrine might
be forthcoming at the administrative level with its network of informal
agreements extending beyond state lines.28  And the potential input
of private groups affected or threatened in some way by the invocation
of the doctrine against their state's laws should not be underestimated.
Many private groups are in a position to convert their control over basic
social goods into public decisions-that is, ones formally "made" by
the authoritative officials-protective of their interests. From various
sort to the public policy doctrine took the form of a general rule: the rights of an inno-
cent purchaser of a mortgaged chattel removed to Texas are superior to those of the
foreign mortgagee despite the mortgagee's priority over such purchaser in the state of
contract. In effect, Texas' courts overrode the usual lex loci contractu choice-of-law rule
with its public policy favoring bona fide purchasers for value. See Consolidated Garage
Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921); Wooten v. Amett Auto'Parts
Co., 286 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Forgan required the Arizona court to decide
the relative priority of a Texas and an Illinois title. The court spurned a lex loci tack
and the concomitant application of Texas law which would have made the Texas title
superior. Instead, emphasizing the reciprocity between Illinois and Arizona in such
matters, the court invoked the Arizona local rule, with the result being to award priority
in Arizona to the Illinois title. See also Union See. Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236
P. 513 (1925).
28. While interstate agreements between legislators principally operate at levels of
high visibility and formality (e.g., compacts or reciprocity laws), those between adminis-
trators are characteristically of low visibility and formality. Exemplary of the latter are
agreements to exchange information on tax returns. See Goldstein, Interstate Enforce-
ment of the Tax Laws of Sister States, 25 STATE Gov'T 147, 161 (1952). See generally
Reisman & Simson, Interstate Agreements in the American Federal System, 27 RUTGERS
L REv. 75 (1973).
Vol. 1974:391] 399
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quarters, the parochialism expressed in an invocation of the public pol-
icy doctrine stands to be answered in kind.
This is not to deny, of course, that a court may often invoke the
doctrine without the materialization of any of these possible repercus-
sions. Indeed, one, would reasonably anticipate variation in response
according to such factors as the size of the class whose interests are
injured by the decision or jeopardized by its implications as precedent,
the nature of the state interest behind the discredited law, and the prob-
able magnitude of the injury or threat of injury to that state interest.
Additionally, proof of effects may often be elusive because of their
low visibility, time lag in surfacing, or inextricability from alternative
possible causes. But these difficulties of substantiation hardly warrant
the opposite inference that invocation of the doctrine produces no such
effects. I assume, then, as a basic hypothesis for further discussion,
that the judicial retaliation witnessed in Forgan v. Bainbridge2o is no
more than the tip of the iceberg.
11. THE JUDICIAL BALANCE REDRAWN
A. General Considerations
In deciding whether to invoke local public policy to render a foreign
law inapplicable, a court typically considers its problem in terms of ex-
clusive interests. In general, a court proceeds on the simple hypoth-
eses that applying the foreign law serves the foreign state's interest
and sacrifices its state's, and that not applying the foreign law promotes
its own state's interest and disserves the foreign state's.8 0 This rather
competitive perspective is not peculiar to conflict-of-laws decisions of
this variety alone. Indeed, the modern, more enlightened approach to
choice of law basically casts the fundamental problem in similarly ex-
clusive terms. Currie's representative formulation of the interest anal-
ysis method reveals such an emphasis:
When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the govern-
mental policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then in-
quire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to pro-
vide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application
of that policy . . . . [T]he court should similarly determine the
29. See note 27 supra.
30. See Ciampittiello v. Ciampittielo, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Loren-
zen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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policy expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has
an interest in the application of its policy.31
Moreover, Currie's resolution of "true" conflict situations"2 -essen-
tially, uniform application of the forum state's rule 3 3 -is hardly out of
keeping with a balance of exclusive interests. For if competition is
really what choice of law is all about, why be a good loser when victory
is yours for the taking?
The usual interest analysis approach in general, and Currie's reso-
lution of its balancing problems in particular, make little sense when
one takes account of-and perhaps gives preponderant weight to-in-
clusive interests. Thus, a court making a choice-of-law decision might
appropriately ask itself how the application (or nonapplication) of the
forum or foreign law might promote (or disserve) interests common
to the two states and, possibly, interests fundamental to a larger,
national or global order. Admittedly, this consideration of inclusive
interests would complicate the judicial balance considerably. But those
troubled by the parochial tendencies of the judiciary may welcome this
mandate for a broader, more disinterested, and creative role for local
courts. Even those dubious of the general utility and practicability of
an inquiry into inclusive interests may well concede its indispensability
before a court declares a foreign law unenforceable as anathema to
local public policy. For purposes of this Article, I seek only to demon-
strate the significance of considering inclusive interests in this limited
context of the public policy doctrine.
In terms of the public policy doctrine, then, two inclusive interests
warrant careful consideration: (1) interstate and international coopera-
tion; and (2) the unimpeded flow of commercial activity between the
states of the United States and between the nations of the world. First, a
court should hesitate to apply the doctrine insofar as its application may
militate against the growth of functional units transcending state and na-
tional lines. Secondly, a judge should consider any adverse effects that
31. CuFuu 183-84.
32, A "true" conflict case is one that involves conflicting interests of two states as
to the law to be applied to the instant case. This focus on interests is distinguishable
from one on the presence of elements in the case involving more than one state, because
a state's contact with the case does not necessarily imply any state interest in the case's
resolution. The furtherance of local policies would not be implicated. See generally
id. at 107-10, 185-93.
33. Compare id. at 183-84, with id. at 191 n.8, 370, and Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757-59 (1963).
Vol. 1974:391]
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application would have on interstate or international commercial trans-
actions by infusing those transactions with uncertainty.
Various commentators have emphasized and elucidated the latter of
these inclusive interests."4 Given the inherent flexibility and manipu-
latability of words and legal doctrine, certainty can, of course, only be
relative. As Yntema has argued, however, these intrinsic obstacles to
uniformity of legal consequence hardly render futile all efforts to assure
that "so far as possible and proper, a given situation should have equal
legal treatment everywhere."3 5  Despite the ultimate plasticity of legal
standards, then, one may still affirm the social value of greater predict-
ability in judicial use of doctrine. With regard to the public policy
doctrine specifically, even Paulsen and Sovern, who characterize the
doctrine as one of various escape devices, seem ready to concede that
it is a particularly grave offender against interests predicated on predict-
ability.36
In light of the manifold uncertainties endemic to the choice-of-law
process generally, 7 however, the force of this latter objection to the
public policy doctrine is obviously limited. Although its place in a more
inclusive balance warrants recognition, my emphasis will be on the first
of the above-named interests, an interest more compelling and far-
reaching in its implications for the choice-of-law process.
B. Suggested Guidelines: The Foreign-Foreign and Domestic-
Foreign Distinction
Courts have typically failed to distinguish between application of the
public policy doctrine to the law of a sister state and that of a foreign
nation (or political subdivision thereof).38 But the inclusive and ex-
clusive interests implicated in the two types of decisions are markedly
different in nature. If courts are to continue to wield this potentially
34. See, e.g., Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156,
165-71 (1929); Nutting, supra note 9, at 198-99; Yntema, The Objectives of Private In-
ternational Law, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 735-37 (1957).
35. Yntema, supra note 34, at 735.
36. Paulsen & Sovern 981. Compare Santoro v. Osman, 149 Conn. 9, 174 A.2d 800
(1961), with Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 170 A.2d 726 (1961).
37. See Ctlau 101, 132-33; Cavers, supra note 10, at 180-84.
38. See Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the
United States, 54 CAinF. L. REv. 1599, 1610-22 (1966). Compare Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), and Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 170 A.2d
726 (1961), with Santoro v. Osman, 149 Conn. 9, 174 A.2d 800 (1961), and Holzer
v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 ('1938).
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destructive doctrine, they must approach it with far more refined ana-
lytic tools. The following discussion attempts to outline the form which
the proposed interest analysis would take in the two categories of
cases-foreign-foreign and domestic-foreign--and to suggest a general
rule or presumption to guide courts in the resolution of each.
1. Interstate and International Cooperation
Professor Richard Falk offers a highly useful model for thinking
about the national and international systems of law:
There is vertical or hierarchical order among formally unequal centers
of legal authority; there is horizontal or nonhierarchical order among
equal centers of legal authority. 39
In a vertical order, a centralized institution allocates to subordinate
bodies the power to make decisions; in a horizontal order, interactions
among decentralized institutions determine decision-making compe-
tence. Although the international legal order partakes of some central-
ized decision-making, 40 its restraints are characteristically of the horizon-
tal variety.41
The difference in the inclusive interests threatened by application
of the public policy doctrine to domestic-foreign law (a sister state's),
as opposed to foreign-foreign law (a foreign nation's or its political sub-
division's), follows from this basic structural distinction between inter-
state and international relations. In the interstate realm, cooperation
assumes vital significance principally because of the increasingly sub-
stantial threat posed by a powerful center to the legal competence of
the individual units. According to a recent study of interstate
compacts, uniform state laws, and interstate associations,4" empirical re-
39. R. FALK, Tim ROLE OF DoESTc CouRTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
21-22 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FALK].
40. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice are prominent in this
regard. The limitations of both institutions, however, are notable: the "domestic juris-
diction" exception in U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7; and the mutual acceptance of com-
pulsory jurisdiction required for submission of disputes to the International Court of
Justice, I.C.J. STAT. art. 36.
41. Professor Falk lists several aspects of the existing horizontal power structure:
self-imposed restraints (limited assertions of control); restraint imposed by circum-
stances (inability to enforce a claim); reciprocity (deference for mutual advantage);
fundamental fairness (respect for procedural due process); international agreement
(obedience to existing formal and express allocations of decision-making power); and
defensive delimitation (deference to unequal distributions of power among horizontal de-
cision-makers). FALx 39-50.
42. Reisman & Simson, supra note 28.
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search detailing trends in the formation and persistence of interstate
agreements, formal and informal, would indicate a substantial increase
in joint activity among officials from different states in the following
areas: (1) gathering and communicating information needed to make
public decisions; (2) agitating for the adoption of certain policies as
law; and (3) prescribing law for the individual states which they repre-
sent. Even accepting the survey's estimate that interstate activity has
approximately doubled over the last forty years, one can hardly discount
the threat posed to this formation of horizontal adhesive by the
center's encroachment. Far more dramatic than the growth in inter-
state cooperation has been the center's appropriation of power to make
decisions (including not only the prescriptive function, but also the pre-
liminary decision-making activities) of major importance in determin-
ing the allocation of social goods." In matters of health and welfare,
for example, one sees the deluge of national legislation in only the
last decade to protect the environment. 44 In the civil liberties area,
it has been federal judicial activism45 and complementary congressional
efforts4" which have begun to effect serious inroads into seemingly in-
tractable patterns of discrimination. The same is true for the allocation
of knowledge, wealth, and virtually all other values for which men com-
pete.47
Writing in the midst of the New Deal's surge in federal government
activity, Goodrich supplemented his case against the public policy doc-
trine with a warning that the chaos in choice of law wrought by this
provincial doctrine might well provoke the center to assume primary
competence in the conflict-of-laws area. 48 Whatever disruption to rea-
sonable expectations and commercial security the doctrine's persistence
has caused and will engender in the future, though, neither the Supreme
43. See generally id. at 95-102.
44. See, e.g., Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, tit. I,
84 Stat. 91, amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq. (1964, Supp. V, 1969) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970)); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857, 1857a-1 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-p (1970)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000a to h-6
(1970)).
47. An attempt is made to summarize these trends in Reisman & Simson, supra note
28, at 95-102.
48. Goodrich, supra note 6, at 34.
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Court nor Congress has shown any noticeable desire to centralize the
conflict-of-laws area, and the general assumption appears to be that
no such measure is in the offing.4" The probable failure of Goodrich's
prophecy, however, should not obscure the progressive thrust of his in-
sight. Although interstate cooperation in choice of law-specifically,
cooperation taking the form of abandonment or severe limitation of
the public policy doctrine-might not really be needed to fend off en-
croachment by the center in the conflict-of-laws area, it is vital to pre-
serving state competence in other areas. That is, with the center ex-
panding its legal competence apace, the public policy doctrine with its
parochializing effects only serves to divide the already outnumbered
forces engaged in turning back the center's aggrandizement. A very
real battle is at hand, then, to maintain the states as viable competitors
with the center for meeting society's ever-changing needs. And though
some may perhaps unequivocally greet further usurpation of decision-
making powers by the center, many are undoubtedly troubled by the
implications of increasingly distant and centralized control of daily life.
Indeed, the extent to which "bigness" will stand in the way of dem-
ocratic government is a consideration not to be lightly dismissed. In
deciding the advisability of invoking the public policy doctrine against
the law of a sister state, therefore, a state court would do well to con-
sider the potential ill effects of this invocation on local government and,
concomitantly, on the quality of life in general.
The stakes in rejecting a law of a foreign nation on public policy
grounds also reflect the nature of the power structure in which the
two jurisdictions-here, the forum and foreign-foreign state-are set.
A domestic court thus addresses foreign-foreign law in the context of
almost exclusively horizontal restraints governing the relationships
between the forum country5" and the foreign one. Cooperative activi-
ties strengthen the bonds between nations. They provide greater assur-
ance of stability in a decentralized system and enhance the possibilities
of reaching consensus among nations as to standards of minimally
acceptable distributions of knowledge, wealth, and other social goods.
49. See Ctnmul 124-27; Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and
Some Questions, 25 ARK. L. REV. 9, 28-33 (1971); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or
Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972); notes 76-101 infra and accompanying text.
50. This shift from forum state to forum country assumes that foreign countries
tend to associate the acts of domestic courts with national attitudes and policies. Cf.
5 G. HACKWORTH, DirEsT OF INTERNATioNAL LAW § 527 (1943) (international re-
sponsibility of federal government for acts of member states).
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In general, then, as cooperation reinforces horizontal restraints, it in-
creases the global consciousness of individual nations and thereby
promotes interests of the most inclusive nature. The lack of deference
for another nation's law inherent in an application of the public policy
doctrine, however, threatens the ultimate realization of these inclusive
interests, for this parochial gesture signals a concern with exclusive in-
terests. As such, it counsels, if not retaliation in kind, at least great
caution and reserve in dealing with the forum nation. And with the
failure of conditions of trust requisite for international cooperation to
obtain, movement toward a more stable and distributively just world
order is postponed and perhaps retarded.5 '
2. Exclusive Interests
The extent to which a state court would be more or less persuaded
by the threat to inclusive interests in the domestic-foreign and foreign-
foreign cases respectively would be expected to vary according to the
court's particular orientation. That is, to most courts the protection
of local autonomy would probably be the greater concern, and they
would therefore tend to apply the public policy doctrine more sparingly
to sister states' laws than to those of foreign nations. More internation-
ally minded judges would probably adopt the opposite tack. In esti-
mating the sacrifice of exclusive interests-the other key factor in the
equation-generally resulting from nonapplication of the doctrine to
domestic-foreign and foreign-foreign law, however, both sets of judges
should be in fundamental agreement. Exclusive interests will typically
be endangered far less by deference in the intranational case. A basic
difference in the power relationship between the forum state and
foreign jurisdiction in the two types of cases is again the controlling
factor. Thus, a central consideration in gauging the sacrifice of exclu-
sive interests in intranational as opposed to international application
of the doctrine is the presence of vertical restraints upon the forum
and foreign states in the former, but not in the latter, situation.
- 51. _On the possibility of federal constitutional constraints based on the center's for-
eign affairs power actuating application or nonapplication of the public policy doctrine
to foreign-foreign law, see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (Oregon escheat
statute, conditioning rights of nonresident aliens to inherit personalty found to intrude
impermissibly into federal government's exclusive competence in foreign affairs, despite
latter's-noncrystallization in treaty form); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)
(Oregon inheritance statute held unconstitutional as circumscribing rights of Yugoslav
nationals as established by 1881 Treaty).
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In the American federal system, federal constitutional and statutory
law basically operate to guarantee a significant realm of consensus
among the states. As the center polices state legislation for consistency
with these nationwide norms-and each state's judiciary maintains a
similar vigil over its own state's laws in accordance with the supremacy
clause-the need for one state court to sit in judgment on another
state's laws is greatly relaxed. Particularly in light of the strictures
placed by the center on state laws infringing on the fundamental human
freedoms,5 2 a presumption that sister state law is compatible with, or
at least tolerably deviant from, forum policies would seem to be
eminently reasonable. 53  This presumption, together with the potential
injury to inclusive interests from application of the public policy doc-
trine in the intranational case, makes out a prima facie case against
application.
With international cases, on the other hand, the possibility is far less
remote that application of the foreign law may effectuate policies truly
repugnant to the forum state's deep-seated principles of morality and
justice. Although horizontal restraints are of indubitable consequence
in the relations of nation-states, a cursory survey of deprivations
suffered by native populations at the hands of authoritarian regimes
should leave little question of the magnitude of the consensus-building
task remaining to be done." At least for the present, the international
system is characterized by horizontal restraints demonstrably limited
in effectiveness in maintaining compliance with the fundamental norms
upon which individual freedom and respect depend, and by a pro-
nounced lack of vertical restraints to supply this deficiency. Accord-
ingly, American courts are forewarned against automatic application
of foreign-foreign law.
52. Although the first ten amendments to the Constitution directly relate to the fed-
eral government alone, Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
a number of the rights granted therein have been held to be incorporated in the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (jury in criminal trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of
expression). The fourteenth amendments equal protection clause is, of course, a major
independent source of protection.
53. Cf. Goodrich, Foreign Facts, supra note 6, at 35; Goodrich, Public Policy, supra
note 34, at 170-71.
54. See, e.g., 2 L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human
Rights, March 1972, at 589-834 (unpublished monograph on file in Yale Law School
Library) (human rights in Eastern Europe and South Africa).
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In this regard, Goodrich notes the probability that courts would need
to invoke the public policy doctrine with the least frequency against the
laws of other English-speaking countries because of their basic "simi-
larity in law and point of view" with the American model." On the
other hand, Goodrich may dichotomize too sharply when he maintains
that a presumption of offensiveness to local public policy should obtain
generally in the foreign-foreign law context.Y° One cannot afford to
lose sight of the significant inclusive interests threatened by appli-
cation of the doctrine to a foreign nation's law, and Goodrich's pre-
sumption would appear to ensure precisely such a myopic perspactive.
Neither can one afford, however, to make the opposite presumption
because excessive caution in applying the doctrine may also prove det-
rimental to inclusive interests. The enforcement of truly reprehensible
laws only serves to legitimize their authority and thereby reduce the
possibilities for global consensus on standards for the distribution of so-
cial goods, consistent with human dignity. Again, such considerations
would not seem relevant to the American state court's decision in the
intranational case.
C. The Bounds of Legitimate Diversity
Attention to the prejudice to inclusive and exclusive interests arising
from application or nonapplication of the public policy doctrine yields
a general distinction between the doctrine's employment in the intra-
national and international public policy cases. Furthermore, I would
make an additional distinction between laws regulating economic mat-
ters and those touching upon human rights. Diversity between forum
policies and those of other nations or sister states in the former area
should be respected as a general rule; diversity in the latter should
be tolerated within far narrower bounds. 7 Thus, a state court should
countenance, in the interest of interstate or international cooperation,
foreign laws incorporating economic policies quite different from its
own. It should not, however, enforce a foreign law which infringes
fundamental individual freedoms and human dignity.
This distinction rests upon a preferential ordering of "personal"
rights before "property" rights. As such, it finds its counterpart in
55. Goodrich, supra note 6, at 35.
56. Id.
57. Cf. Falk, Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Act of State: Suggestions for a Mod-
ified Approach, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 1, 2-3, 13-18 (1961).
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a long line of Supreme Court decisions, most notably perhaps in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 8 But the validity of this priority rule
does not rest on its status in the Supreme Court. The proposed rule
is a policy recommendation, not an attempted synthesis of constitutional
doctrine. Indeed, recent Supreme Court pronouncements would seem
to render suspect any claims that it has constitutionalized this rule.
One such statement is especially worth noting because it helps estab-
lish the limitations of the suggested rule. In Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp.,5 9 Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority that
the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. . . . In
fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right
to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other.60
My policy recommendation, therefore, is made with recognition of the
often ill-defined boundary between personal and property rights.
Lynch itself exemplifies the gray area. For at least according to Mrs.
Lynch, the garnishment of her savings account by HFC threatened her,
a $69 per week wage earner, with such financial hardship as to render
her unable to protect herself and her family from the personal degra-
dation accompanying lack of food and shelter.6' As studies correlating
depressed political activity with nutrition levels indicate, 62 the prom-
ise of the cherished political freedoms is illusory without adequate
protection of property rights.63
This merging of economic matters and human rights in certain con-
texts, however, does not imply that the general distinction is not serv-
iceable in the great majority of cases. It is with this caveat that the
distinction is proposed as a guideline for triggering the application or
nonapplication of the public policy doctrine to foreign laws.6
D. A Public Law Perspective
Public international law provides in the act of state defense an in-
58. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938).
59. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
60. Id. at 552.
61. Id. at 539, 552 n.21.
62. See generally A. KEYs, THE BIOLOGY OF HUMAN STARVATION (1950).
63. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
64. Since justice need not be blind to specifics, a court may well want to consider
the extent to which a predominantly property-oriented law would work a deprivation of
basic liberties in the instant case.
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structive analogy to the type of review recommended under the public
policy doctrine. As formulated by the Supreme Court in 1897, act
of state requires that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory."6  As thus described, the act of state principle would appear
to constitute a blanket prohibition on inquiry into the validity (under
domestic, international, or even the foreign state's own standards) of
the act of state. Although some early cases may be read to support
such a construction, 66 the Court's 1964 decision in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino7 plainly rejected it. In rendering its most com-
prehensive explanation to date of the act of state doctrine, the Court
in Sabbatino established that act of state involves not blind deference
to the foreign act, but rather a "balance of relevant considerations."681
As the Court's rather indulgent and unrigorous inquiry into the law-
fulness of the expropriation at issue in Sabbatino intimates, however,
the Court would not affirm lower court decisions that the foreign act
of state is invalid unless a very strong case could be made for its illegit-
imacy under international standards.6 9
On the other hand, among the conditions elucidated by the Court
as illustrative of those which a court might regard as significant in its
"balance of relevant considerations" is one which would lead courts
to lean in the direction of a finding of invalidity where noneconomic
deprivations are involved. If the court finds that the act of state vio-
lates a standard of customary international law presently supported by
consensus among states-a description satisfied virtually exclusively by
norms regulating deprivations of human rights--the court will not en-
force any claim or allow any defense resting on the legality of the gov-
ernmental act.70 Thus, an act of state's consistency with socialist rather
65. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
66. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
67. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
68. Id. at 428.
69. Pursuant to its "balance of relevant considerations," the Court undertook to in-
quire into the Cuban government's violation of a customary norm of international law
supported by a present consensus among nation-states. In canvassing international opin-
ion on norms of possible applicability, the Court only discussed shared expectations re-
garding "foreign expropriations." Id. at 430. The Cuban government's taking, how-
ever, raised the more precise issue of the extent of international agreement in opposition
to discriminatory (on the basis of nationality) and confiscatory expropriations. The
Court skirted this harder question and instead rested its decision on the lack of consen-
sus on the more general issue. Id. at 436-37. See Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino,
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935, 944 (1964).
70. 376 U.S. at 428 (dictum); see Falk, supra note 69, at 939.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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than capitalist norms should be no objection to its validity, for neither
set of norms can lay claim to international consensus in this age of
rapidly changing ideological loyalties. But invidiously discriminatory
acts would not be shielded from judicial declarations of invalidity by
their governmental origin.71  Accordingly, the distasteful and consen-
sus-debilitating spectacle of an American court rewarding acts of racial
or religious discrimination can no longer be staged-if, indeed, it ever
legitimately could-under the guise of act of state. The moral bank-
ruptcy of the infamous Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme,7 2 in which the Second Circuit considered itself bound to ac-
cept the validity of a Nazi confiscation of a Jew's property, would thus
hopefully be relegated to historical curiosity.
The balance struck in the act of state cases between respect for the
foreign act and the claims for its invalidation73 provides a general model
for the suggested application of the public policy doctrine. 74  Invo-
71. Acts performed by private persons under compulsion of law, which qualify for
the act of state umbrella, should thus be afforded no greater immunity. On the com-
pulsion doctrine, see Fortenberry, Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Viola-
tion -Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 Omo ST. L.J. 519, 534-38 (1971);
Maw, United States Antitrust Law Abroad-The Enduring Problem of Extraterritorial-
Ity, 40 ANrxmusT L.J. 796, 803-04 (1971). See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (D. Del. 1970); Holzer v. Deutsche
Reichsbahn-GeseUschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 479, 14 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1938). Holzer ex-
emplifies precisely the type of case against which the human rights analysis in the ac-
companying text is directed.
72. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). The second Bern-
stein case, which went the other way only after a state department letter (20 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 592 (1949)) to Bernstein's attorneys indicating the executive's wish that
the judiciary disregard act of state considerations in cases of Nazi expropriations, sheds
no less discredit on the unreflectingly "neutral-principled" judiciary. See Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954), modifying 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
73. The Court in Sabbatino did not cast the act of state balance in terms of defer-
ence to the foreign state. Rather, the perspective informing its treatment of act of state
was intranational: concern that the judiciary accord appropriate deference to the Con-
stitution's broad allocation of powers to the executive branch in international affairs.
The functional significance of its formulation of the doctrine, however, also comports
with a perspective of foreign deference, for the considerations which the Court eluci-
dated for the judicial balance serve to isolate those occasions on which nondeference to
the foreign act of state would most effectively promote global interests. See generally
Falk, supra note 69.
74. Ten years after Sabbatino was handed down, it remains the authoritative state-
ment on act of state. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972), involved the "Bernstein exception" to the act of state doctrine-i.e. the rule,
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cation of the doctrine in the intranational case would thus be an
extremely rare, if not nonexistent, phenomenon. Given the basic
agreement in human rights policies between the involved states, the
considerations counseling nonrecourse to the public policy doctrine
would be expected to prevail. In the international case, however, the
reasons against invoking the doctrine would give rise to no such pre-
sumption against invocation because of the much more substantial pos-
sibility of foreign/forum state differences about matters of human rights.
E. Justice to the Individual
Since the approach to the public policy doctrine set forth in this Ar-
ticle attempts to describe a balance of interests, the impact of applying
the doctrine to a particular plaintiff or defendant should be relevant
to the court's decision in the instant case. Accordingly, if the appli-
cation would leave the adversely affected party with an alternative
forum, it would obviously be less objectionable than if it would not.
First of all, as to defendants deprived of a defense, this mitigating cir-
cumstance will necessarily not obtain because the plaintiff can pursue
his claim to a judgment on the merits. Secondly, unless courts are
willing to take on the task of inquiring into the factual availability of
alternative fora for plaintiffs, one can never be certain whether making
the dismissal formally without prejudice is any fairer, and hence less
objectionable, than dismissal with prejudice. Finally, it bears repeating
that regardless of its solicitude for an individual's plight, a court has,
in applying the doctrine, nonetheless declared foreign law to be ana-
thema to local public policy and has thereby triggered all the adverse
effects which such a pronouncement may incur. In terms of the weight
to be assigned to this individual fairness factor in the judicial
balance, I would make an assignment consistent with Goodrich's
stemming from the 1949 Bernstein case, that a court will follow an executive directive
not to apply the doctrine to immunize a foreign act of state. By a 6-3 vote, the Court
refused to engraft the exception onto the Sabbatino formulation of the act of state prin-
ciple. And although the Court held 5-4 that Sabbatino did not control the instant case,
only Justice Powell's concurrence questioned the validity of Sabbatino.
Nor did the "Sabbatino Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970), effect signif-
icant inroads into the 1964 decision. Though enacted to "reverse" the Court's decision,
see generally Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967), the statute has been rendered inconsequential by a hostile
judiciary. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp.
92, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972).
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observation that while the dismissal without prejudice may recommend
itself over that with prejudice, the former is "bad enough. 75 Although
this consideration may sway a court in a close case, its role should be
no greater than that.
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP
The preceding analysis of the public policy doctrine addresses the
"ought" rather than the "must" of the problem. It invites courts to
broaden their scope of inquiry to comport with the actual social con-
sequences of their decision. A very different tack would have been
to argue that the Constitution requires abandonment of the doctrine
in whole or substantial part. In this section, I shall review briefly the
major constitutional objections which may be made to the doctrine.
The emphasis will be on the limitations in constitutional theory which
make the appeal to enlightened self-interest undertaken in this Article
a far more promising approach.
A. Full Faith and Credit
The full faith and credit clause is the Constitution's most explicit
statement regarding the effect to be given sister states' laws in local
courts.78 On the basis of the Supreme Court's affirmation of "the
strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause
looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations
or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states, '77 one
might well assume that this obvious candidate for attacking the public
policy doctrine constitutes a potent weapon indeed. But despite the
clause's mandatory direction and sweeping Supreme Court pronounce-
ments like the above, the case law on the deference constitutionally
required toward foreign laws reveals no more than peripheral control
vested in the federal judiciary over local use of the public policy doc-
trine. In terms of the interest analysis approach to choice of law-
a mode employed by the Court with reasonable consistency 8-full
faith and credit is satisfied so long as "the state whose law is applied
has a legitimate interest in its application." 79  As Paulsen and Sovern
75. Goodrich, supra note 6, at 31.
76. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
77. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Griffin v. MeCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
79. CuiRnu 237. A notable exception to this general proposition is the Court's in-
sistence on the use of the law of the state of incorporation in adjudicating the rights of
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indicate, it will be exceedingly rare to find a court substituting forum
law for foreign law in the absence of a more than minimal forum state
interest.80
Furthermore, since the public policy doctrine rests in part on the
state's interest in protecting its judicial processes from corruption, 81 this
latter interest in nonapplication of foreign law would presumably sup-
port any dismissal without prejudice on public policy grounds. 82 That
this purity-of-process interest alone would also validate a decision on
the merits applying forum law is less persuasive. But even assuming
that it would not, full faith and credit makes a rather insubstantial dent
in the doctrine's armor.
B. Due Process
Unlike the full faith and credit clause, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment is not limited in its reach to domestic-for-
eign laws. Thus, if the only law reasonably applicable in the instant
case is that of country X and a state court applies its own state's law
(or perhaps state Y's or country Z's), the adversely affected party has
been denied due process of law and can look to the Federal Constitu-
tion for a remedy.83  In other respects the due process prohibition on
arbitrariness offers perhaps somewhat less, but plainly no more,8 4 am-
a member of a fraternal benefit society. See Order of United Commercial Travelers
v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544
(1925); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
80. Paulsen & Sovern 972, 980-81. As I indicated earlier, I do not quarrel with
Paulsen and Sovera's findings about the presence of significant contacts. Rather, I dif-
fer with their readiness to conclude from the presence of contacts in a given public pol-
icy case that those contacts, and not considerations of local public policy, virtually al-
ways explain the result. See text following note 23 supra.
81. Cf. CtRIE 90.
82. But, again, unless courts attempt to inquire into prejudice in fact-an unlikely
allocation of judicial resources--dismissals without prejudice will often achieve the same
effects as dismissals with. And a dismissal without prejudice by a court in state A
may simply be construed as one with prejudice by a court in state B. See Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 562 n.17 (2d Cir. 1962); Paulsen & Sovern 1012.
Ilustrative of the rare case constitutionally infirm for lack of a sufficient forum state
nexus may be Fox v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909),
in which the court disallowed a defense for reasons of local public policy, despite basi-
cally nonexistent forum state contacts with the transaction. See note 20 supra.
83. CuRRIE 195-97; cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). See also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 379-95 (1971).
84. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1932), does indicate
a difference in the strengths of the due process and full faith and credit clauses in thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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munition than the full faith and credit clause in the conflict-of-laws
area, particularly with regard to the public policy doctrine.
C. Equal Protection
Another line of attack, one principally championed and explored by
Currie,8 5 proceeds from the equal protection clause. In general, if the
classification effected by application of the public policy doctrine lacks
a plausible relation to the achievement of some discernible state
policy, the equal protection clause would require that the doctrine not
be applied. 6 Under exceptional circumstances, moreover, the doc-
trine would have to measure up to a stiffer standard. If the application
would deprive someone of a "fundamental interest," the state policy
served by application would have to be a compelling one.8 7  And if
the application somehow would carve out a "suspect classification," the
relation between the classification effected and the informing goal must
be not simply plausible, but virtually perfect.88 These tests are for-
midable, but whether they come into play outside the realm of theoretical
possibility as far as the public policy doctrine is concerned seems du-
bious. Thus, as a demand in this context for almost certainly no more
than rational classification, the equal protection clause comprises but
yet another brake on state court decisions verging on the aberrational.89
choice-of-law area, suggesting that the latter is greater. The demise of Clapper and this
distinction, however, has been persuasively argued. Currie, for example, not content
simply to trace the Court's disinheritance of Clapper, proceeds to fit Clapper on its facts
into the mainstream of later decisions. CuRuum 205-14. On the equality of the two
tests, see id. at 195, 271-72; Paulsen & Sovem 1015.
85. See Cumu 526-83.
86. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Op-
tical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
87. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
88. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61 (1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For further discussion of the proposition that the focus
in this group of cases is the relative perfection of the classification rather than a compel-
ling state interest, see Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J.
1237, (1974).
89. The implications of the Court's new sliding-scale equal protection standard, see
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972), for the public policy doctrine are not clear. But since the Court only appears
to be applying this median standard to interests or classifications at least verging on, if
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D. Regulation of Commerce
The commerce clause90 has, on a few occasions, been used by the
Court to prohibit state activity not precluded by congressional legisla-
tion but deemed by the Court to be in violation of the clause as unduly
burdensome to interstate commerce. 9 ' In line with this assumption
of competence by the judiciary, one might argue that -the Court should
abolish or sharply delimit the public policy doctrine as a source of
insecurity in interstate and international transactions. But to single out
the public policy doctrine for this harsh treatment, from the morass
of diverse and uncertainty-producing rules in the choice-of-law area,
would be a feat of extraordinary myopia. Assuming that the Court
would take a more intellectually defensible position, it would have to
choose between (1) expounding and, almost necessarily, policing a set
of choice-of-law rules or an authoritative general standard (such as
a balancing of interests) to be employed by every state court, and
(2) staying out of the matter altogether. There should be little question
that a Court less than elated with its present caseload would opt for
the latter. This scenario, furthermore, presupposes an initial readiness
on the Court's part to extend dramatically the existing authority under
the case law for federal judicial competence based on the commerce
clause. A successful attack on the public policy doctrine via the
commerce clause thus seems twice removed from the realm of pos-
sibility.
E. Federalism
A more freewheeling type of constitutional challenge might eschew
reliance on any one constitutional provision. Rather than seeking to
fit the public policy doctrine under one textually-based constitutional
limitation or another, proponents of this view would argue that the
doctrine is inconsistent with the structure of the federal union estab-
lished by the Constitution. Aside from general philosophical notions
of federalism,92 they could point to various provisions in the Consti-
not actually possessing, fundamental or suspect stature, see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), I assume that consideration
of the new standard would not change my estimate in the accompanying text of the
equal protection clause's constraints on employment of the public policy doctrine.
90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl, 3.
91. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Huron Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945); cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (dictum).
92. On the need for cooperation among the 'units of a federal system, see E.
McWnnomY, COMPARATV FEDnAnLism 19-20, 78-89 (1962).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/1
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tution which, taken together, indicate the framers' intent that the center
act to minimize causes for friction among the member states. The al-
locations of power made to the center by the full faith and credit, privi-
leges and immunities,93 commerce, guaranty,9 and compact9 5 clauses,
as well as by the article II grant of jurisdiction to the federal judiciary
over controversies between states, could be marshalled to support the
claim. These provisions may be said to demonstrate an intent that the
center guard against divisive tendencies inimical to both, the stability
of the whole and the possibilities for mutually beneficial interactions
among the parts. Approaching the compact clause from this perspec-
tive, for example, one would find in capsule form the delicate equilib-
rium of the federal plan. On the one hand, the requirement of con-
gressional approval for compacts between two states (or between a
state and foreign country) evinces a concern-quite understandable in
light of the then recent Confederation experience-that cliques of
states (or state-foreign power alliances) might threaten the center's po-
sition of dominance. On the other hand, the clause does affirm that
such agreements have a place in the federal structure. 6
The argument against the constitutionality of the public policy
doctrine would thus be that, as a parochializing force, the doctrine is
inconsistent with the basic design of the federal system. By destabiliz-
ing and militating against the formation of interstate agreements, the
doctrine invites assumptions of power by the center which aggravate
the existing disparity in power between the center and the states.
When Mr. Justice Jackson wrote of the full faith and credit clause that
[i]t was placed foremost among those measures which would guard the
new political and economic union against the disintegrating influence
of provincialism in jurisprudence, but without aggrandizement of
federal power at the expense of the states97
he came as close as any commentator (or court) to advocating this
structural line of constitutional attack in the conflict-of-laws area. And
although many may find this mode of comprehensive constitutional in-
terpretation attractive, one need not wonder at the dearth of comment
supporting or exploring Justice Jackson's suggestion. As the leading
93. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
96. See generally Reisman & Simson, supra note 28, at 84 n.53.
97. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945) (footnote omitted).
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proponent of the structural method has observed, 8 courts are simply
not accustomed to thinking in such terms. Concomitantly, neither
are courts' would-be persuaders, the commentators, accustomed to
writing in such terms. Accordingly, the federalism argument against
the doctrine, though cogent when cast in a policy mold, is virtually
certain to receive short shrift as a constitutional objection.
IV. TiE RET AT FROM PAROCHALiSM
The likelihood that the federal judiciary will be the agent of serious
inroads into the public policy doctrine is slight. The constitutional re-
straints on the doctrine are, at their current stage of development, pe-
ripheral indeed. But congressional competence to circumscribe the
doctrine is a very different matter. Congress' article IV power to
implement the full faith and credit clause by appropriate legislation
would almost certainly be equal to the task. The seemingly infinitely
expandable commerce clause99 and perhaps the fourteenth amend-
ment's enforcement provision 0" would also be available to supply any
deficiency in Congress' article IV powers. The real question is not
one of congressional competence to prescribe, but rather one of con-
gressional inclination. In the latter regard, Congress appears to be
determined to avoid such snarled matters as choice of law, its mystify-
ing swipe at the conflicts area in 1948 notwithstanding.' 0'
If the retreat from parochialism is to begin, the state courts them-
selves must be the ones to initiate it. As a veritable institution in
choice of law, moreover, the public policy doctrine will undoubtedly
not give way easily. But if courts ponder and articulate for other courts
the inclusive interests at stake when local public policy is invoked to
render foreign law inapplicable, this doctrine should before long begin
to assume its appropriate and narrowly confined place.
98. See C. BLACK, STRucrtuRE AND REILATiONSHP IN CONSnTtIONAL LAW 11
(1969).
99. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938).
100. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966).
101. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1970)). On Congress' amendment of the full-faith enabling legislation to include stat-
utes, see Curmu 200-01; Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Pub-
lic Policy, 19 U. Cm. L Rv. 339, 343 (1952).
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